









Chapter Title: ‘Sustainability’ 
 




IPE and sustainability have co-evolved over the past 40 years under the twin pressures of ever-
deepening neoliberal globalisation and environmental degradation. Globalisation has seen the 
massive expansion in international trade, investment and finance and an associated rise in 
international organizations, multinational corporations (MNCs) and civil society organisations. 
In conjunction with the development and spread of information and communications 
technologies, the global political economy has transnationalised giving rise to new forms of 
public, private and hybrid governance. Globalisation has been associated, however, with high 
levels of tropical deforestation, fisheries depletion, biodiversity loss and global warming. From 
a social justice perspective, deep-seated inequalities remain within and between countries in 
the Anthropocene (Biermann et al 2012), with coefficients of inequality now greater than they 
were at the outset of the globalisation push (Picketty 2014).  
 
The negative trends associated with neoliberal globalisation have given rise to efforts to embed 
the environment as a category within IPE theory. Three established ‘environmental’ 
perspectives and one emerging ‘sustainability’ perspective can be identified: green 
mercantilism, liberal environmentalism, eco-socialism and sustainability governance. The first 
three build on well-established IPE approaches, integrating nature into pre-existing 
anthropocentric, state-centric theories; the latter, in contrast, builds on emerging practices to 
develop a more ecocentric, multi-actor approach. To illustrate the latter, I examine how 




IPE and Sustainability 
Emerging as a distinct subdiscipline of international relations in the 1970s, IPE came under 
pressure in the 1980s to respond to the increasing number of environmental threats. The broad 
approach taken was to treat these as additional policy issues, manageable by states acting alone 
or in cooperation. This remains the dominant approach today despite its evident failure and 
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early recognition by Williams (1996) that environmental issues are different due to their 
‘uncertainty, uniqueness and irreversibility’ and, one could add, scientific complexity.    
 
Analysts focused initially on four issues (Young 1994): transboundary conflict (e.g. acid rain), 
tragedy of the commons (e.g. overfishing), natural resource exploitation (e.g. deforestation in 
the Amazon), and cross-sectoral (e.g. global trade policy). Conceptualised this way, solutions 
lay in national action coupled with international cooperation. This ‘first-world’ framing, 
however, was challenged by developing countries who considered the environment a ‘luxury 
good’, something affordable once hunger and poverty were tackled. In the early 1970s, such 
North/South disagreement threatened to derail the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE), held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972.  
 
Despite the challenges, many deemed UNCHE a success as it put the environment on the 
international agenda and agreed several important initiatives including establishing the United 
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). Despite UNEP’s status as a ‘program’ not a 
specialised agency, and a budget a fraction of that required, it subsequently played a catalytic 
role in fostering international environmental action within the UN system. Under its leadership, 
the United Nations set up a World Commission on Environment and Development in 1982 
chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, a former Norwegian Prime Minister. With high-level 
representation from countries around the world, including significant and effective 
representation from developing countries, the Brundtland Commission issued Our Common 
Future report in 1987.  
 
The Brundtland Report aimed to reconcile First World concerns over environmental protection 
with developing country concerns over poverty. It did so by elaborating the idea of ‘sustainable 
development’, a concept derived from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s 
1980 World Conservation Strategy. The Brundtland Commission did not merely appropriate 
the sustainable development idea but transformed it from a ‘limits to growth’ approach to one 
that denied any contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection. 
Following Brundtland, the world accepted without much evidence that high rates of economic 
growth and extensive levels of environmental protection were compatible. The resultant 
‘compromise of liberal environmentalism’ (Bernstein 2001) was on full display at the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 




In retrospect, UNCED constituted a high water mark in international environmental concern, 
the issue moving down the global agenda in the ensuing years. At the time, however, 
considerable optimism permeated state environmental agencies, business groups, and civil 
society organisations that the world had finally grasped the environmental challenge. Deals 
were struck on several high profile issues including the signing of the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); and states 
agreed to establish a new UN institution to oversee the implementation of Agenda 21, the 
Commission on Sustainable Development. While disappointment attended the failure to 
negotiate an international forestry agreement, the Global Forest Principles that substituted for 
it was considered a solid compromise to tackle deforestation and forest degradation under a 
new norm of sustainable forest management (Gale & Cadman 2014).  
 
Building on UNCED’s formulation of sustainable development as ‘development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’, analysts investigated processes of weak and strong ‘ecological modernisation’ (Mol & 
Spaargaren 2000). The distinction depends on whether nature, conceptualised as a form of 
capital, is substitutable for other types of manufacturing, human and social capital. Different 
conceptions of sustainable development were possible because UNCED was silent on capital 
substitutability and agnostic regarding the form of state. While a general preference for 
‘market-led’ development strategies implemented by liberal democratic states existed, 
countries with developmental states employing state-owned enterprises, government planning 
and protectionism were not excluded. In short, as an ‘essentially contested concept’ capable of 
numerous, divergent meanings, the practice of sustainable development pivoted on whether it 
was framed within nationalist, liberal or socialist political economy (Dobson 1996; Jacobs 
1999; Connelly 2007).   
 
Despite an emerging consensus in policy circles that sustainable development is compatible 
with weak ecological modernisation, a critical tradition has consistently called the approach’s 
feasibility into question. One of the earliest and most trenchant critiques was Redclift’s (1987), 
who argued that ‘development’ must be ‘subjected to redefinition, since it is impossible for 
accumulation to take place within the global economic system we have inherited without 
unacceptable environmental costs. Sustainable development, if it to be an alternative to 
unsustainable development, should imply a break with the linear model of growth and 
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accumulation that ultimately serves to undermine the planet’s life support systems’ (Redclift 
1987, 4).  
 
Such a break has yet to occur, however. IPE has contributed to this by aiming mostly to 
integrate nature into pre-existing frameworks based on established ways of thinking giving rise 
to forms of green mercantilism, liberal environmentalism, and eco-socialism. While vigorously 
disputing each other’s conception of economic value each approach conceives economic value 
as a priori definable, humanistic and monistic (Gale 2018). Notably, liberal environmentalism 
treats economic value as synonymous with exchange value, employing cost-benefit analysis 
and contingent valuation to commensurate it in dollar terms. Following an analyses of 
conventional IPE responses, therefore, I outline a fourth approach, termed here sustainability 
governance, that builds on emerging consumption and production practices to develop a more 
integrated approach.   
 
IPE Approaches to Sustainability  
A variety of typologies have been used to categorise IPE responses to the environment. 
Williams distinguishes realist, liberal and Marxist perspectives noting that all three adopt a 
‘technocentric and anthropocentric approach to natural resource use’ (1996, p. 48). The first 
two, being grounded in positivism and empiricism, are insufficiently attentive to the need for 
theoretical innovation and to the actual transformations occurring on the ground. Williams 
also criticises both of these approaches for embracing environmental economics, which treats 
the ‘economic’ and the ‘ecological’ as discrete phenomena arguing instead that ‘economics 
and the environment are inseparable’ and that ‘the economy alters the environment and the 
environment in turn affects the economy’ (Williams 1996, 56).  
 
In their book Paths to a Green World, Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) distinguish between 
market liberalism, green socialism, bioenvironmentalism and institutionalism. Market 
liberalism ‘is grounded in neoclassical economics and scientific research’ and promotes 
market-led economic growth and high per capita incomes (Clapp & Dauvergne 2005, 4). In 
contrast, green socialists see inequality and environmental degradation as fused 
demonstrating a shared concern over ‘inequality and the environmental consequences related 
to it’ (Clapp & Dauvergne 2005, 12). These two approaches differ from 
bioenvironmentalism, which stresses ‘the biological limits of the earth to support life’ with a 
focus on ‘limits to growth’ and ‘carrying capacity’; and from environmental institutionalism 
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which embraces ‘many of the broad assumptions and arguments of market liberals’ but 
stresses the need ‘for stronger global institutions and norms as well as sufficient state and 
local capacity to constrain and direct the global political economy’ (Clapp & Dauvergne 
2005, xx).  
 
To these IPE typologies can be added those used in the varieties of capitalism approach 
outlined in Nölke’s chapter (this volume). With a focus on the West, first-generation VoC 
analysts parsimoniously distinguished between liberal and coordinated market economies, the 
former mapping directly onto IPE’s liberal paradigm and the latter onto a social-democratic 
version of its socialist approach. Initially not covered in the VoC literature was IPE’s 
economic nationalist approach, but Nölke’s state-permeated market economy (SME) 
addresses this gap by identifying how China and India differ from Britain and Germany in 
financial openness and capital controls. The VoC approach has been applied to understand 
differences in environmental policy and practices: Mikler (2007) highlights differences in the 
strategies of American, German and Japanese automobile manufacturers that reflect the way 
they are regulated in their domestic economies. However, VoC’s inductive approach to 
identifying varieties of capitalism means there is no equivalent to Clapp & Dauvergne’s 
bioenvironmentalism and environmental institutionalism categories as neither of these are 
used by states to coordinate markets.            
 
The account below builds on these typologies to assess recent developments in IPE and 
sustainability.  To the conventional IPE categories of realism, liberalism and Marxism, I add 
two others: an ecologism category similar to Clapp and Dauvergne’s bioevironmentalist 
category and an emerging sustainability governance category that expands their category of 
environmental institutionalism to take account of emerging local, national and global public, 
and especially private, governance of production and consumption relations. I illustrate the 
implications of the latter approach by reviewing the trade versus environment debate in IPE 
theory and at the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
  
Green Mercantilism 
The core tenets of green mercantilism are grounded in IR Realism’s concern over 
order/disorder and its ontological privileging of the state over other forms of social organisation 
(Williams 1996; Vogler 2011). Green mercantilists share IR Realism’s broad understanding of 
the interstate system as characterised by anarchy where individual states must have enough 
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power to ensure their own survival. Under anarchy, conflict will occur between states over 
scarce natural resources such as oil, potable water and agricultural land. A focus of green 
mercantilists is on specific resource conflicts including Arctic and Antarctic oil supplies, water 
conflicts in the Middle East and Asia, and ‘land grabbing’ in Africa (e.g. Homer-Dixon 1991;  
Kugelman & Levenstein 2009). While green mercantilists are not alone in analysing such 
topics what marks this perspective out from others is the view that states respond to them 
strategically rather than cooperatively.   
 
Significant differences can be observed between green mercantilists and other perspectives 
with regard to international trade policy. Green mercantilists view the economic, political and 
natural realms as fused, all three contributing to realising a state’s ‘productive powers’ (List 
1841) and enhancing its security. Consequently, a state’s political, economic and 
environmental policies should align, which may require states to defect from free trade regimes 
and embrace protectionism.  Given this perspective green mercantilists are able to explain, if 
not condone, why states like China limit the export of rare earth metals given the strategic 
importance of solar power; and why, given the domestic security ramifications of limiting 
carbon emissions, signatories to the Paris Climate Agreement prefer voluntary Nationally 
Determined Contributions over mandatory targets. 
 
Liberal Environmentalism 
In contrast to the statist focus of green mercantilism, liberal environmentalism examines global 
environmental cooperation using the lens of regime theory (e.g. Young 1989; Haas, Keohane 
& Levy 1993). Several features of the international political economy explain why such 
environmental cooperation is necessary. First, national production many generate negative 
externalities as when sulphur emissions from coal-fired generators deposit acid rain on 
neighbouring countries or when carbon emissions cause global warming and climate change. 
Second, open-access resources that lack clear public or private property rights as in high seas 
fisheries lead to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968) necessitating international 
agreements to regulate catch levels. Third, inter-state political and economic rivalry may 
threaten critical earth systems creating momentum to cooperate as in the case of the Convention 
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.   
 
While liberal environmentalists recognise that markets fail and that state intervention to 
provide public goods and regulate negative externalities is required, they treat the free market 
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as essential to sustainability and promote market-based solutions to environmental problems. 
A practical example is the promotion of emissions trading schemes to tackle climate change.  
Observing that the atmosphere is an open-access resource and overused by individuals and 
firms as a sink for carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions, the liberal solution is for 
governments to legislate cap-and-trade emissions trading schemes to limit the total amount of 
GHGs a firm can release into the atmosphere (the cap element) and issue permits (the trade 
element) to enable companies to buy and sell pollution rights to meet firm-specific targets.  
 
Eco-Socialism 
In contrast to green mercantilists and liberal environmentalists, eco-socialists seek to promote 
environmental justice via a critique of capitalism and by proposing socialist alternatives (e.g. 
O’Connor 1988: Burkett 2009; Foster, Clark & York 2010). James O’Connor for example has 
identified a ‘second contradiction of capitalism’ in addition to a first contradiction between the 
‘forces’ and ‘relations’ of production (O’Connor 1988). In conventional Marxist analysis, 
capitalism ‘produces its own gravediggers’ due to its inherent tendency to overproduction. In 
the drive to realise surplus value, competition forces capitalist businesses to over-produce, 
lowering prices and generating a realisation crisis. As businesses go bankrupt and 
unemployment increases, capitalists demand state intervention to bail them out exposing the 
myth of the self-regulating market.  
 
Likewise, O’Connor argues there is a second contradiction of capitalism between the forces 
and relations of production on one hand and the conditions of production on the other. Unlike 
the first contradiction, this is a crisis of ‘underproduction’ because capitalist firms, locked into 
competitive markets, under-invest in maintaining the physical conditions of capitalist 
production—forests, fisheries, agricultural land, energy sources and so forth. Capitalist 
businesses, struggling to realise as much surplus value as possible, appropriate natural 
resources and waste sinks at exchange values significantly lower than their use values. 
However, by failing to recognise and take action to conserve resources and limit pollution, 
capitalists again become their own gravediggers as natural resource depletion and the 
accumulation of toxic waste necessitates state regulation and planning that once again 
undermines the myth of the self-regulating market.  
 
At the global level, eco-socialism has been influenced by Robert Cox’s neo-Gramscian 
approach to IPE (1981). Building on Cox’s distinction between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical 
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theory’, eco-socialists analyse how global capitalism generates ecological crises and injustice 
by supporting the neoliberal hegemonic order under Pax Americana. From this perspective, 
many international institutions identified by liberal environmentalists as contributing to 
sustainable development are critically reinterpreted as driving the world towards ever-deeper 
unsustainability. Organisations like the World Bank, IMF and WTO are viewed as enhancing 
capitalism’s capacity to exploit workers and the environment in the periphery of the world 
capitalist system. Eco-socialists champion counter-hegemonic forces such as the World Social 
Forum which protests capitalist globalisation at international economic and environmental 




Ecologism takes issue with the anthropocentrism underpinning green mercantilism, liberal 
environmentalism and green socialism, claiming instead that nature is intrinsically valuable 
(e.g., Leopold 1949; Devall &Sessions 1985; Dobson 2007).  The essential difference between 
these two views is captured in Aldo Leopold’s ‘land ethic’:  
 
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a 
community of interdependent parts… The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of 
the community to include soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land… In 
short, the land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, 
and also respect for the community as such (Leopold 1949, 239-240).  
 
Key ecological ideas of the ‘land ethic’ include a relational ontology, an extended concept of 
community and an alternative understanding of value. Dobson (2007, 2-3) builds on these ideas 
to distinguish ‘environmentalism’ from ‘ecologism: the former ‘argues for a managerial 
approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without 
fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption’, whereas 
the latter ‘holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our 
relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life’.  
 
Ecologism’s focus on an extended natural-cultural community has generated proposals that 
operate mainly at sub-state levels of analysis. Social ecologists like Murray Bookchin (1982) 
and Deep Ecologists like Arne Naess (2005) champion small-scale, community-based, self-
governing and self-sufficient political organisations, whereas Kirkpatrick Sale (1985) has 
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argued for a bioregional approach linked to natural boundaries like watersheds and Daly and 
Cobb (1989), develop the idea of a national ‘community of communities’. As a result of its 
community and regional focus, ecologism is usually not identified as an approach in IPE. In 
addition, it does not engage with the core issues of interest to IPE scholars such as international 
trade, investment, monetary, aid and development policy. From an IPE perspective, since no 
state is run by a government promoting policies based on ecologism, there is no point in 
engaging with it theoretically. This lack of engagement on both sides is a problem, however, 
since neither side understands each other’s core conceptual categories or concerns. 
 
Sustainability Governance 
In his analysis of IPE and the environment, Williams (1996, 55-56) calls for a new theoretical 
approach based on neo-Gramscian political theory and ecological economics (Williams 1996, 
55-56). Yet no such theory has emerged in the past two decades. In the interim, a great deal of 
practical and theoretical work in ‘sustainability governance’ has occurred, which bears on 
many core IPE issues including trade, investment and monetary policy as well as the nature of 
the state and its relationship to MNCs and civil society organisations. In this section, I review 
the literature on ‘sustainability governance’ and illustrate its relevance to IPE as an emerging, 
alternative account of the sustainability challenge through an example of certified trade.  
 
There are several good descriptions of the practice of sustainability governance in the literature 
at different levels of analysis. At the national level, Alperovitz (2014) provide excellent 
accounts of the US’s social enterprise movement where ‘people join together through some 
form of public, community, or employee-owned business to meet local needs and thereby 
regain a measure of local economic democracy and control’ (Alperovitz 2014, 195). The 
institutional forms employed include ‘community development corporations, community 
development financial institutions, social enterprises, community land trusts, employee-owned 
enterprises, and cooperatives’ (Alperovitz 2014, 195). To this list can be added a range of other 
forms of community-based organising such as the transition town, slow food, farmers’ market, 
organic and permaculture agriculture, community-supported agricultural, community gardens, 
bioregional, community energy, op shops, and public transport movements. What these 
initiatives have in common is the reinvigoration of low-throughput community provisioning 




It is a mistake, however, to conceptualise sustainability governance as exclusively, community-
based. Many participants exchange goods, services and experiences with distant others using 
private governance systems to make them more rewarding, fairer and more sustainable 
(Cashore, Auld & Newsom 2004; Gulbrandsen 2010; Cadman 2011; Gale & Haward 2011; 
Auld 2014). To ensure exchange meets these expectations, practitioners set standards backed 
by certification and labelling schemes to regulate the extraction, production, transportation, 
retail and disposal of the inputs necessary to yield the goods and services demanded and 
consumed. Two examples of global standards organisations are Fairtrade International and the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Fairtrade International sets Fairtrade standards for its 
member organisations and in 2015, the sales revenue of Fairtrade products, mainly coffee, 
cocoa, bananas, tea, fruit and sugar, reached one billion dollars for the first time, up 14% over 
the previous year. FSC sets standards for the forest industry and has experienced similar growth 
with almost 200 million hectares of forest in 2017. A large number of other global standards 
organisations exist to regulate capture fisheries, farmed fisheries, sugar, palm oil, carpets and 
rug production and more.  
 
Sustainability Governance and Trade 
How does IPE analyse this emerging practice of ‘certified trade’? If IPE textbooks are any 
guide, the answer is to ignore it. Whereas there is a great deal of coverage of ‘free trade’ versus 
‘protectionism’ and the role of the World Trade Organisation in managing competing state 
interests, the rise in certified trade is rarely if ever analysed (but see Ervine & Fridell (2015) 
which includes a chapter on sustainable consumption). IPE’s ‘statist gaze’ also limits its 
capacity to perceive certified trade arrangements which are mostly developed and promoted by 
business and civil society organisations. In the technical trade literature, and in addition to 
expressing a certain disdain for certified trade’s significance because product volumes and 
dollar sales are currently a mere fraction of global totals, analysts adopt the generalised 
presumption that certified trade preferences are really protectionist trade preferences in 
disguise, again diminishing any challenge it presents to mainstream theory and practice 
(Ehrlich 2010).  
 
The subsumption of certified trade into the free-trade versus protectionism debate is also 
evident at the WTO  which has debated the protectionist potential of ‘eco-labels’ for over 20 
years since they were placed on the agenda of the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) 
in 1996. As the number and reach of eco-labels and associated certification and labelling 
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programs has grown, delegates expressed increasing concern at their trade distorting nature. 
Mavroidis and Wolfe cite the ‘now famous’ 2007 complaint of the Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines delegation against the GlobalG.A.P agricultural standard that ‘the proliferation of 
standards developed by private interest groups without any reference to the SPS Agreement or 
consultation with national authorities is a matter of concern and presents numerous challenges 
to small vulnerable economies’ (2017, 2). Noting that ‘voluntary standards’ can be de facto 
obligatory for small producers who are at risk of being locked out of global value chains if they 
fail to comply with requirements, these authors examine how the WTO should respond to such 
‘behind the border’, potentially market-restrictive measures.  
 
From a sustainability governance perspective, certified trade is neither free-trade nor 
protectionist but expresses a desire to realise sustainability by ensuring one’s market purchases, 
whether domestic or international, ‘do no harm’. Building on the political consumption and 
ethical consumerism literatures (e.g. Stolle, Hooge & Micheletti 2005; Barnett, Cafaro & 
Newholm 2005), the approach recognises the existence of a segment of consumers who desire 
to go beyond basic, often compromised, national and international standards and discriminate 
between otherwise like products based on embodied and non-embodied process and production 
methods (ppms). Thus, instead of their being only two basic trade-related preferences there are 
four, characterised by Ehrlich (2010, 1021) as ‘free traders’, ‘fair traders’, ‘general 
protectionists’ and ‘economic protectionists’. Beyond free-traders and general protectionists 
recognised by mainstream IPE, this typology identifies fair traders seeking certified products 
regardless of country of origin and economic protectionists seeking domestic products 
regardless of process and production methods.   
 
The implications of certified trade for conventional trade theory are significant. According to 
the theory of comparative advantage, countries should specialise in the production of goods 
and services intensive in the factors in abundance, exchanging them for goods and services 
intensive in the factors they lack. It can be demonstrated that specialising in this way increases 
the total volume of goods in the system, and thus ‘wealth’ measured either in terms of the 
aggregate volume of goods or their exchange value equivalent. There is a very important 
underlying proviso, however, which is that use of the abundant factors is sustainable: that is, at 
a minimum, that the country’s use of its renewable resources (forests, fisheries and soils) does 
not undermine the capacity to regenerate, depletion of non-renewable resources (oil, rare earth 
metals, minerals) occurs at an optimal rate, animal welfare is safeguarded and humans human 
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rights are respected. To the extent that these presumptions do not hold any increased production 
of goods and services comes at a significant cost to environmental, social and animal welfare. 
 
A range of arguments are employed to rebut trade protectionist arguments and these are also 
deployed against certified trade (Bhagwati 1993; Krugman 1997). An important argument in 
favour of free trade derives from the Environmental Kuznets’ Curve (EKC), which purports 
to demonstrate that it does not matter if two countries’ initially diverge in their sustainability 
practices because trade, by promoting economic growth, leads to improved sustainability 
outcomes over time. This occurs because increased wealth shifts citizens’ preferences in 
favour of the ‘luxury good’ of environmental protection while simultaneously enabling the 
increased tax revenue available to be deployed for abatement. Other identified positive 
effects of trade for sustainability are shifts from dirty to clean technologies, from 
manufacturing to services production, and from high to lower fertility rates. From this 
dynamic economic perspective, a poor country with less sustainable practices will 
automatically converge towards a rich country with more sustainable practices once it crosses 
some specific GDP per capita turning point. 
 
However, the EKC argument is suspect given that empirical studies show that the posited 
effects vary from pollutant to pollutant, are weak to non-existent with regard to carbon 
dioxide and biodiversity loss, and may occur at turning points significantly higher than the 
modest ones initially estimated (Van Alstine & Neumayer 2008; Carson 2009; Lenzen et al 
2012). As a consequence of these results, those studying the EKC have become increasingly 
cautious in interpreting its meaning, placing renewed emphasis on politics and policy. Carson 
(2009, 20) concludes pessimistically that the ‘belief in an autonomous EKC relationship 
engendered an unfounded optimism that growth by itself would be helpful for the 
environment. As a result there was a lost decade or more during which environmental 
economists failed to focus on other potential driving forces behind changes in environmental 
quality within a country’. Van Alstine and Neumayer (2008, 56) state that ‘we cannot take for 
granted that LDCs will experience an increased demand for environmental regulations. We 
need to consider what mechanisms are needed to translate society’s preferences into policy-
making’.   
 
Taking certified trade seriously as an alternative to free trade or protectionism highlights an 
overlooked area for policy intervention—direct preference shaping. A focus on preference 
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shaping, however, raises many thorny questions concerning the factors influencing their 
formation (Jackson 2005) and the rights and freedoms of individuals (Thaler & Sunstein 2003). 
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) reconcile the latter tension in their ‘libertarian paternalism’ 
approach to policy and the ‘nudge agenda’ it has given rise to. Treating individuals as having 
potentially misguided preferences due to a range of cognitive biases (e.g. myside bias, present 
bias, confirmation bias) in making decisions concerning superannuation, diet and energy use, 
these authors argue in favour of altering default settings to encourage better decisions. Thus, 
given it is in society’s interests that people donate their organs at death, opt-out not opt-in organ 
donations schemes should be set up since most people never get around to signing the required 
paperwork. 
 
Thaler and Sunstein’s approach fails to fully recognise the extent to which the now vast 
literature on the biological, behavioural, sociological and cultural bases of values, attitudes, 
beliefs and preferences undermines conventional notions of human rationality upon which a 
great deal of IPE thinking is based including, of course, liberal environmentalism’s rational 
utility maximising individual. Pushed further, Stanovich (2003) identifies two major 
deficiencies: ‘mindware gaps’ and ‘mindware contamination’. Mindware gaps are a product of 
the kind of biases identified by Thaler and Sunstein whereas mindware contamination is more 
insidious and due to religious, mystical and magical thinking which explicitly forbids 
questioning by ‘promising rewards for unquestioning faith in the memeplex’ (Stanovich 2009, 
p. 76).  These ideas are taken even further by Gale (2018), who argues that the new literature 
on human preference formation necessitates a complete rethinking of aggregative notions of 
consumer and political sovereignty and necessitates a shift to more deliberative forms of 




In this chapter, I have argued that IPE continues to theorise sustainability from within 
mainstream perspectives employing well-developed modernist constructs such as the unitary 
state, the rational individual, and a singular capitalist trajectory. While there are now ‘green’ 
versions of realism, liberalism and socialism, these approaches have overlooked the actually 
existing political economy of sustainability that is emergent within the interstices of a 
disintegrating neoliberal global capitalist world order. The only approach to take this emerging 
political economy of sustainability seriously has been the sustainability governance approach 
15 
 
due to its focus on certified trade which it distinguishes from free trade and protectionism alike. 
However, more research is required on this sustainability governance approach and especially 
the implications of the new biological, social, cognitive and cultural literatures for the 
contingency and lack of reflexivity of individual preference formation. If aggregating non-
reflective and likely erroneous individual preferences into group preferences no longer tells us 
much about what people want economically and politically, then much greater attention needs 
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